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INTRODUCTION

It has been said that creditors have better memories than debtors.1
That saying rings true yet again. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, there is a norm
that all senior creditors must be paid back in full before any junior interests
are satisfied at all.2 This is known as the absolute priority rule.3 In 2017,
the United States Supreme Court decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
Corp. (Jevic).4 The Jevic Court overruled a Third Circuit case,5 which
held that a structured dismissal6 could deviate from the absolute priority
rule in order to meet a better and quicker result in the settlement context
for certain creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.7 The Supreme Court held,
in relevant part, that structured dismissals that deviate from priority rules
as part of a final distribution of assets may not be approved over the
objection of creditors.8
While the Court’s decision remedied the priority-deviation found in
the Third Circuit case, it limited its decision to the specific structured
dismissal at issue because it was a final distribution of assets.9 By limiting
its decision to final dispositions in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court left
the door open for priority-deviation in interim distributions of assets.10 In
fact, the Court noted the benefits of interim priority-deviations and
expressly included an example of such a deviation in the context of an

1

Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanac, (1736).
See Amy Timm, Note, The Gift That Gives Too Much: Invalidating a Gifting
Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1649 (2013).
3 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (in order to be fair and equitable concerning
classes of unsecured claims during plan confirmation: “the holder of any claim or interest
that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account
of such junior claim or interest any property . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
4 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
5 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015).
6 See id. at 181 (defining structured dismissals as “simply dismissals that are preceded
by other orders of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving settlements, granting
releases, and so forth) that remain in effect after dismissal.”); see also Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at
979 (relying on the American Bankruptcy Institute in defining structured dismissals as a:
“hybrid dismissal and confirmation order . . . that . . . typically dismisses the case while,
among other things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party
releases, enjoining certain conduct by creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or
unwinding transactions undertaken during the case.”) (internal quotations omitted).
7 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85.
8 See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 976–77.
9 See id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a
Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic
priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final
distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”) (emphasis added).
10 See id. at 985 (suggesting that interim distributions of assets are permissible in
Chapter 11 cases due to the difficulty of applying priority rules to unresolved claims).
2
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interim settlement.11 Due to Jevic’s express approval of interim prioritydeviation, this Comment suggests that the interim settlement context could
be the avenue of choice going forward for creditors seeking to deviate
from priority rules in Chapter 11.12
Moreover, the Court’s holding could open the floodgates for an
increase of future priority-deviation, despite the fact that priority must be
followed at the final resolution of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.13 Chapter
11 debtors are still allowed to settle claims with creditors outside of the
priority scheme before the case is made final, especially if there are
Bankruptcy Code related justifications for priority-deviation.14 While the
Supreme Court’s Jevic decision implied a more strict application of the
absolute priority rule, an increase in deviation may nonetheless result
because creditors will now know the parameters of the rule and how to
work around it. As will be discussed further in this Comment, a lack of
priority can create unjust results in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.15
Before the Supreme Court decided Jevic, there existed a circuit split
concerning application of the absolute priority rule vis-à-vis the settlement
context.16 The Third Circuit decision that was overruled by the Supreme
Court in Jevic held that a structured dismissal as part of a final settlement
may deviate from priority.17 Conversely, a Fifth Circuit decision,18 held
that in order to be fair and equitable, priority must be respected in Chapter
11 cases even in the analysis of a settlement agreement.19 This Comment
11 See id. (distinguishing the Second Circuit decision of In re Iridium Operating LLC,
as a case that involved an interim distribution of settlement proceeds, from the Third Circuit
case of In re Jevic that involved a final disposition of a settlement and structured dismissal);
see also Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating
LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding an interim distribution of settlement
proceeds that deviated from priority).
12 See discussion infra Part III.A.
13 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (noting the justifications for interim prioritydeviation in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the Court stated: “[b]ut in [interim distributions] one
can generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-violating
distributions serve.”); In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 467 (“Here, the bankruptcy court identified
a proper [Code] justification for the [interim] Settlement.”); In re Fryar, 1:16-bk-13559SDR, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123, at *14 (E.D. Tenn. April 25, 2017) (noting that the
priority-deviating-settlement at issue must be justified by Code-related objectives in order
to be upheld over creditor objections).
15 See discussion infra Part III.B.
16 Compare Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In
re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that a structured dismissal
as part of a settlement agreement, may, in rare instances, deviate from priority rules), with
In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that priority must be followed
in order for a settlement to be approved as fair and equitable).
17 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184–85.
18 In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
19 See id. at 300.
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will discuss the facts of each Circuit in order to show the impact and
procedural history of the Supreme Court case.20 This Comment will then
argue that the Supreme Court did not fully resolve the issue of absolute
priority,21 and absolving this issue can be accomplished by applying the
Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard to all phases of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding.22
As a precursor to the background section of this Comment, it is
important to note that Chapter 11 bankruptcy law is founded upon
principles of priority.23 Statutory provisions assign creditors to a certain
pecking order for purposes of repayment by the debtor.24 For example,
Section 507 of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code contains a general priority
scheme, which favors certain creditors over others in regards to the order
in which proceeds from the debtor’s assets are distributed.25 Priority rules
such as Section 507 should be well known by Chapter 11 parties due to
the prospect of future asset reorganization. Priority for creditors could
mean the difference between getting paid in full and not getting paid at all.
Alternatively, the absolute priority rule, found at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), only applies to confirmed plans of reorganization.26
Before Jevic, there was confusion amongst the courts as to whether or not
the absolute priority rule applied to the settlement context of a Chapter 11
proceeding.27 The Jevic Court, in dicta, ultimately stated the rule does
apply to the settlement context, but only if the settlement at issue is a final
disposition.28 Therefore, the absolute priority rule currently remains
confined to the final disposition stage of a Chapter 11 case, leaving open
the option to deviate at all other stages. While the rule itself is arguably
sui generis by virtue of the limited context in which it is applied,29 the
objective of this Comment is to expand the absolute priority rule to apply
to all phases of Chapter 11.30
Since the settlement context can be the avenue of choice for future
priority-deviation, it is important to consider the power a judge has in
20

See discussions infra Part II.B–D.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
22 See discussion infra Part III.D.
23 See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“The Code’s
priority system constitutes a basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law.”).
24 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 507 (2016).
26 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28 See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (the Court stated that interim distributions of assets that
deviate from priority are usually justified, therefore suggesting priority-deviation in the
pre-plan context is permissible).
29 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
30 See discussion infra Part III.D.
21
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approving a settlement. The decision of whether to uphold an agreement
between parties “lies within the discretion of the trial judge;” and for an
appellate court to reverse, it must be shown that the trial court abused its
discretion.31 Therefore, most decisions concerning settlements at the trial
court level will be upheld, absent a showing that the decision was handed
down arbitrarily or willfully.32 It should be noted, however, that
bankruptcy courts may uphold settlements only if they are found to be fair
and equitable.33 Due to the Supreme Court decision in Jevic, the allowance
of priority-deviations in interim distributions of assets as opposed to final
dispositions can create a vague line for bankruptcy courts to interpret;34
which may cause confusion as to what distributions will be upheld as fair
and equitable.
As mentioned above, the crux of this Comment aims to show that the
issue of absolute priority enveloping interim Chapter 11 distributions can
be resolved by following the Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard at
all stages of a bankruptcy proceeding.35 The Fifth Circuit noted that, “[t]he
words ‘fair and equitable’ are terms of art [in bankruptcy law] – they mean
that ‘senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones.’”36 While
this may make settlements harder to achieve,37 a rigid application of the
absolute priority rule lets creditors know where they stand from the onset
31 In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Matter of Jackson
Brewing Co. (In re Jackson Brewing Co.), 624 F.2d 599, 602–03 (5th Cir. 1980)); see
Matter of Walsh Const. Inc., 669 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Matter of
Ocobock, 608 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Albert-Harris Inc., 313 F.2d 447,
449 (6th Cir. 1963).
32 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541
(1931)).
33 Id. (quoting Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)) (citing
In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d at 602).
34 See Stephen J. Lubben, Supreme Court Ruling Draws a Vague Line in Bankruptcy
Cases, N.Y. TIMES. (April 14, 2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/04/14/business/dealbook/supreme-court-ruling-draws-a-vague-line-in-bankruptcy-cases
.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdealbook-indebt&action=click&contentCollection
=dealbook&region=stream&module=streamunit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&p
gtype=collection (discussing the Court’s noted contrast between interim and final
distributions of assets as well as the vagueness that can correspond between the terms
“interim” and “final” distributions, author Stephen J. Lubben noted, “[o]f course, this line
is not always obvious. In the automotive cases, for example, the assets of General Motors
and Chrysler were sold to newly formed buyers. The sale process itself was interim . . . but
the outcome of that process was largely set once the sale closed. Nonetheless, Justice
Breyer suggest these two sales were an example of permissible interim distributions.”).
35 See discussion infra Part III.D.
36 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (quoting SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.,
379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965)) (citing Anderson, 390 U.S. at 441).
37 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015) (“If courts required settlements to be
perfect, they would seldom be approved . . . .”).
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of any possible litigation. It also lets debtors know their specific
obligations and could eventually facilitate quicker negotiations. Thus,
adhering to the absolute priority rule outside of the final disposition
context could lead to more efficient negotiations.
Ultimately, if the absolute priority rule is to have any teeth, it must
be implemented in all aspects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and
not just in final dispositions. Specifically, the absolute priority rule must
apply to interim settlements in order to avoid the potential increase of
priority-deviation through this medium. Most importantly, adhering to a
rigid application of priority at all stages of a Chapter 11 case would
dovetail more completely with the fair and equitable standard found
throughout bankruptcy law. By applying the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, in
the event that an interim settlement is approved and a senior creditor is
skipped in favor of a more junior creditor, the deciding court should be
deemed to have abused its discretion.38
It has been noted that, “[e]quitable considerations should be
preeminent in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”39 There is no
fairness or equity to be found when senior creditors are skipped over by
more junior creditors in order to facilitate quicker and more efficient
Chapter 11 reorganizations.40 While in practice a lenient priority
mechanism appears to create a more seamless transition for
reorganization, it nonetheless burdens creditors who are left completely
out of the equation after junior interests’ skip over them in priority. By
allowing interim devices to deviate from priority, the senior creditors in a
Chapter 11 case are at a greater risk of leaving the bankruptcy proceeding
empty handed.
Part II of this Comment will outline the general background terms
and functions of bankruptcy law. It will also outline the facts and
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit decision, the Third Circuit decision, and the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in overruling the Third Circuit. Part III of this
Comment will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision, the dangers of
priority-deviation, alternative viewpoints supporting lenient application of
priority, and the Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard and why it
needs to apply to all stages in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Finally, Part IV
of this Comment will conclude the issue.

38

In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298.
Id. at 300. See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); see also Demet
v. Harralson, 399 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1968).
40 See discussion infra Part III.C.
39
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
It is easy to fall into the false dichotomy that describes Chapter 11 as
only a device for reorganization and Chapter 7 as the only means of
liquidation.41 Conversely, Chapter 11 bankruptcy expressly envisions
liquidation through a plan, “[a]nd the debtor (and thus its management)
has an absolute right to one conversion between the two chapters.”42
While this is true, many financially stressed businesses seek protection
through the instruments of Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a means of
reorganizing their debt in an effort to continue on with their business.43
Conventional wisdom explains why the debtor’s management prefers
Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7—it is because the Bankruptcy Code
orders a trustee in every Chapter 7 case.44 Alternatively, in Chapter 11,
the custom is that the debtor and its administration remain “in possession,”
with the rights and duties of a trustee.45 This gives the Chapter 11 debtor
much more breathing room to operate its business and ward off the
demands of its creditors.46
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay is issued to
thwart creditors from entering into further debt collection processes.47 The
stay “enjoins creditors from enforcing pre-petition obligations” or
pursuing the debtor’s property.48 After the stay is issued and creditors are
halted from debt collection, the goal becomes the debtor’s exit from
bankruptcy while maximizing repayment.49 The debtor offers a “plan of
reorganization,” which entails an agreement “to repay a portion of the debt
[owed] over a specified period of time.”50 While the reorganization plan
is discussed “between the debtor and a committee appointed by the United
States Trustee on behalf of the creditors[,]” as mentioned above, the
41

Stephen J. Lubben, Article, Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2007).
Id. at 66.
43 Elizabeth Blakely, Comment, Dewey Ranch and the Role of the Bankruptcy Court
in Decisions Relating to the Permissible Control of National Sports Leagues Over
Individual Franchise Owners, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 105, 108 (2011).
44 Lubben, supra note 41, at 66 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-02).
45 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1107).
46 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Article, Bankruptcy’s Corporate Tax Loophole, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2273, 2282 (2014); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244
(1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.”).
47 See Blakely, supra note 43.
48 See Dick, supra note 46.
49 See id.
50 Blakely, supra note 43; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29.
42
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debtor’s management assumes a role as the debtor in possession51 and
keeps control of the business and its assets.52 With the permission of the
bankruptcy court, financing is often approved for the debtor in possession
to allow the bankrupt business to carry on its operations during the stay
period.53
In general, the Chapter 11 plan is an amalgam of distribution; it lays
out the procedure for dividing assets to various constituents.54 Due to the
significance of the plan, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the right to
file a Chapter 11 plan within 120 days.55 Once the plan of reorganization
is set in stone, “Chapter 11 rules require the creditors to either accept or
reject the plan.”56 The reorganization plan is approved if the following
two conditions are met: “(1) the plan is accepted by more than half of the
total number of claimants in each class; and (2) the amount claimed by
those accepting claimants is at least two-thirds of the total amount claimed
against the debtor by that class.”57 If all classes of creditors do not meet
these conditions and the plan for reorganization is rejected, “the
bankruptcy judge still has the discretion to approve the plan over an
objection by the creditors.”58
A major condition is that the reorganization plan must be “fair and
equitable” in regard to the dissenting classes.59 A plan is deemed “fair and
equitable” when dissenting class members are given property equal in
value to their allowed claims, or to the extent less than that amount is
received, “no creditor of lesser priority (or any equity security holder)
receives any distribution under the plan.”60 This requirement, which is
paramount in bankruptcy law, is normally referred to as the “absolute
priority rule.”61 This rule serves as an important protection for creditors
by ensuring that, “unless their claims are paid in full or they agree
otherwise, the Chapter 11 plan will – with limited exceptions – respect the
51

See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1979).
Blakely, supra note 43, at 108–09.
53 Id. at 109. (citing Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank
Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 143, 162
(2007)).
54 Dick, supra note 46, at 2283.
55 Id.
56 Blakely, supra note 43, at 109 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1126).
57 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)) (internal quotations omitted).
58 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)); see Jeffery M. Sharp, Bankruptcy Reorganization
Section 1129, and the New Capital Quagmire: A Call for Congressional Response, 28 AM.
BUS. L.J. 525, 550 (1991); see also Jeffrey I. Werbalowsky, Reforming Chapter 11:
Building an International Restructuring Model, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 561, 574 n.40
(1999).
59 Dick, supra note 46, at 2284 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
52
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relative collection rights of creditors under state law.”62 Future sections
of this work discuss how the absolute priority rule ought to apply without
exceptions throughout a Chapter 11 case and not just in confirmed plans
of reorganization.63
B. The Fifth Circuit’s View: Adherence to the Absolute Priority Rule
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit decided the case of In re AWECO, Inc.
(AWECO),64 which ruled that the fair and equitable standard applies to
settlements and that “fair and equitable” means compliant with the priority
scheme, even outside the context of a Chapter 11 plan.65 There were three
parties involved in this case: AWECO, Inc. (“AWECO”), United
American Car Co. (“United”), and the United States.66 The debtor,
AWECO, engaged in various business endeavors, but was mostly
concerned with its oil and gas business.67 AWECO voluntarily filed a
Chapter 11 petition in early 1981, and filed a plan of reorganization several
months later.68 The plan was never offered to the court for confirmation
or presented to creditors for authorization.69
One of AWECO’s creditors, United, had an unliquidated and
unsecured claim for roughly $27 million, which produced the appeal to the
Fifth Circuit.70 The claim stemmed from two contracts between AWECO
and United wherein “AWECO agreed to purchase approximately $40
million worth of railroad cars from United.”71 AWECO declined to fulfill
its end of the bargain and United sued for fraud and breach of contract,
asserting $27 million in damages.72 After two years of litigation and while
AWECO’s Chapter 11 petition was pending, AWECO and United reached
a settlement.73 The settlement’s terms called for AWECO to transfer some
$5.3 million worth of property and cash to United.74 Part of the assets to
be transferred from AWECO to United included property that secured
Sutton Investments, Inc.’s (Sutton) claim, which is another one of
AWECO’s creditors.75
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 296.
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AWECO filed notice with the bankruptcy court in early November
of 1981, noting its aim to settle the litigation.76 AWECO’s four creditors:
“[t]he Department of Energy, the IRS, Sutton, and the Creditors’
Committee all filed objections to the proposed settlement.”77 On
December 30, 1981, the bankruptcy court held a hearing to consider the
objection from the Department of Energy, the IRS, and Sutton, which
heard testimony from: “AWECO’s president, the court-appointed
examiner, the debtor’s comptroller and accountant, and an attorney
representing United in the Georgia litigation with AWECO.”78 A portion
of the testimony focused on the fairness of the agreement between United
and AWECO.79 United provided its reasoning for accepting $5.3 million
on its claim of $27 million, stating that United had been able to recoup
enough of its losses to reduce the claim; they wished to avoid the delay,
risk, and expense involved in more litigation; and United wanted to settle
so it could count the proceeds in its 1981 taxable year.80
Further testimony showed the benefits to AWECO stemming from
the settlement agreement.81 Moreover, a rather large amount of testimony
also concerned AWECO’s interest in a non-operational oil refinery located
in Lake Charles, Louisiana.82 While previous managers of the refinery had
been unable to operate it for a profit, AWECO’s president declared that it
would function under its control.83 He also said that the refinery formed
the basis for a successful reorganization plan, and a court-appointed
examiner testified as to the liquidation value, estimating it at $13 million
without the knowledge of any prior liens.84 Counting the refinery, the
examiner estimated that the proposed settlement would leave $30 million
in the estate, while his testimony on specific assets listed properties that
totaled only $17.5 million in value (including the refinery).85

76

In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 296.
Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (concerning the benefits conferred to AWECO stemming from the settlement
agreement, the court noted: “The AWECO attorney involved in the Georgia litigation
stated that terminating the litigation would save an estimated $200,000 – 250,000 in legal
expenses of trying the suit; the two previous litigation had cost AWECO over $700,000.
He also testified as to the weakness of AWECO’s primary defense to the suit. AWECO’s
comptroller declared that the settlement would generate a loss for the company that would
carry back to offset $2-2.5 million of tax liability.”).
82 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 296.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
77

2017]

The Not-So-Settled Absolute Priority Rule

301

At the end of the hearing, the court declared it would approve the
settlement and the next day it issued a written order, saying the settlement
was “fair and equitable” and “in the best interest of the Debtor, its estate,
and its creditors.”86 The bankruptcy court allowed a payment of $1 million
to United after ten days and ordered that the completion of the settlement
occur within one month.87 The IRS and Department of Energy sought a
rehearing, which was granted and contained contrary testimony from
AWECO’s president stating that the company had no intention to operate
the refinery and wanted to sell it.88 The government moved for a
continuance to develop evidence concerning the value of the refinery, but
the court denied the motion.89 The court was only willing to allow a
government request to submit an appraisal of the facility if United would
extend its time limit on confirmation of the settlement, but because counsel
for United noted the stay would jeopardize the deal, the court denied the
stay.90
The IRS and Department of Energy then appealed to the district
court, arguing the settlement’s fairness to other creditors, rather than the
fairness between AWECO and United.91 The district court rejected the
arguments and upheld the lower court’s decision by relying on the fact that
the bankruptcy court had taken testimony on the settlement’s fairness to
creditors and that the bankruptcy judge had extensive knowledge of the
case due to months of presiding over the reorganization proceedings.92
The district judge concluded that, because it was shown through testimony
that a settlement with United would give AWECO its only chance at
reorganization, the settlement benefitted all creditors.93 The government
then brought the appeal to the Fifth Circuit claiming that the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in approving the settlement without sufficient
information and that fairness and equity fell victim to an apparent need for
speed in approving the agreement.94
In sum, the key issue in AWECO was whether the “holder of an
outstanding senior claim can validly object to a proposed settlement with
a junior claimant on the basis that the settlement would keep the senior
claimant from being paid in full.”95 The court reasoned that, “[a]s soon as
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 297.
Id.
In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 297.
Id. at 298.
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the debtor files a petition for relief, [the] fair and equitable settlement of
creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”96 The court deemed
the settlement in question to fail the fair and equitable standard because it
put the junior creditor’s interest before the senior creditor’s interest.97 The
court noted that when courts approve settlements that deviate from the fair
and equitable standard, the approving court abuses its discretion.98
Ultimately, the court stated that, “[e]quitable considerations should
be preeminent in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”99 The decision
in AWECO stands for the notion that as soon as the debtor files a petition
for relief, fair and equitable settlements of the creditors’ claims become
the goal of the proceedings.100 Unlike the Jevic decision discussed further
infra, the AWECO Court concluded that the absolute priority rule is a firm
pillar of priority, even in the settlement context.101 The Third Circuit
disagreed with the decision of AWECO and sought to bring leniency to the
application of priority rules in the settlement context of a Chapter 11 case,
much to the dismay of unpaid senior creditors.102
C. The Third Circuit’s View: Deviation from the Absolute Priority Rule
In 2015, the Third Circuit decided a case filed in Delaware
concerning a corporation operating in New Jersey entitled Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic).103 The
case featured a class of objecting creditors that were skipped over in favor
of more junior creditors in a Chapter 11 proceeding, after a “structured
dismissal” was approved as conditioned by a settlement agreement.104 The
Third Circuit held that in rare cases a structured dismissal may be
approved even if it contains a deviation from the Bankruptcy Code’s
absolute priority rule.105 The court reasoned that the settlement remained
the “least bad” option and thus deviation from the priority scheme norm
was permissible.106 While overruled, in order to glean a better
understanding of the unpaid creditors’ claim and the subsequent Supreme
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Id.
See id.
98 See id.
99 Id.; see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966); see also Demet v.
Harralson, 399 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1968).
100 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298.
101 See id.
102 See discussion infra Part II.D.
103 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015).
104 See id. at 185–86.
105 Id. at 184–85.
106 Id. at 185.
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Court decision discussed more thoroughly infra,107 a full discussion of In
re Jevic is necessary.
Jevic Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic”) was a trucking company with its
headquarters located in New Jersey.108 In 2006, after a steep decline in
Jevic’s business, a subsidiary of the private equity firm Sun Capital
Partners (“Sun”) obtained Jevic in a leveraged buyout made possible by
various lenders led by CIT Group (“CIT”).109 The buyout included an $85
million revolving credit facility by CIT to Jevic, which Jevic could use as
long as it held at least $5 million in assets and collateral.110 Unfortunately
for Jevic, “[t]he company continued to struggle in the two years that
followed, however, and had to reach a forbearance agreement with CIT—
which included a $2 million guarantee by Sun—to prevent CIT from
foreclosing on the assets securing the loans.”111 By May of 2008, Jevic’s
board of directors authorized a bankruptcy filing due to the company’s
stagnant performance and the expiration of the forbearance agreement on
the horizon.112
On May 19, 2008, Jevic ceased substantially all of its operations, and
its employees received notice of their imminent terminations.113 “The next
day, Jevic filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.”114 At the point of filing
the Chapter 11 petition, Jevic owed approximately: “$53 million to its
first-priority senior secured creditors (CIT and Sun) and over $20 million
to its tax and general unsecured creditors.”115 An Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (“Committee”) was assigned to represent Jevic’s
unsecured creditors by June of 2008.116
Most notably for the purposes of the following Supreme Court
decision: some of the terminated truck drivers (“Drivers”) of Jevic filed a
class action against Jevic and Sun claiming various federal and state
abuses of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts
(WARN);117 “under which Jevic was required to provide sixty days written
notice to its employees before laying them off.”118 While the Drivers filed
their WARN claim, “the Committee brought a fraudulent conveyance
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
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See discussion infra Part II.D.
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 175.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175–76.
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:21-2 (2007).
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action against CIT and Sun on the estate’s behalf, alleging that Sun, with
CIT’s assistance, ‘acquired Jevic with virtually none of its own money
based on baseless projections of almost immediate growth and increasing
profitability.’”119 The Committee asserted that Jevic’s bankruptcy had
escalated because of the poorly advised leverage buyout and by adding
debts it could not service.120 The Committee described Jevic’s demise as:
“the foreseeable end of a reckless course of action in which Sun and CIT
bore no risk but all other constituents did.”121
The bankruptcy court granted in part and denied in part CIT’s motion
to dismiss the case almost three years after the Committee filed its
fraudulent conveyance action against CIT and Sun.122 The court held that
the fraudulent transfer123 and preferential transfer124 claims by the
Committee were adequate.125 The court noted the great possibility for
abuse in leveraged buyouts and determined that the Committee had
adequately alleged that: “CIT had played a critical role in facilitating a
series of transactions that recklessly reduced Jevic’s equity, increased its
debt, and shifted the risk of loss to its other creditors.”126 Alternatively,
due to the Committee’s vague and sparse allegations for (1) fraudulent
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544; (2) equitable subordination of CIT’s
claims against the estate; and (3) aiding and abetting Jevic’s officers and
directors in breaching their fiduciary duties, the Court dismissed all three
state law claims without prejudice.127
In March 2012, representatives from the Committee, CIT, Sun, the
Drivers, and what remained of Jevic, came together to discuss a settlement
of the Committee’s fraudulent conveyance action.128 At the time of the
settlement negotiation, Jevic’s only remaining assets were the action
against CIT and Sun and $1.7 million in cash (which was subject to Sun’s
lien).129 In order to repay the lender group led by CIT, all of Jevic’s
tangible assets had been liquidated.130 When the dust settled, the
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In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176 (internal quotations omitted).
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121 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
122 Id. at 176.
123 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1979) (defining fraudulent transfers and obligations).
124 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1979) (defining preferences).
125 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 176.
126 Id. (citing In re Jevic Holding Corp., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3553, at *10 (Bankr. D.
Del. Sept. 15, 2011)) (quoting Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1073
(3d Cir. 1992)).
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Committee, Jevic, CIT, and Sun constructed a settlement agreement that
contained four major provisions, i.e.:131
(1) The parties would exchange releases for their claims against
each other and the fraudulent conveyance action would be
dismissed with prejudice.132
(2) CIT would pay $2 million into an account earmarked to pay
Jevic’s and the Committee’s legal fees and other administrative
costs.133
(3) Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to
a trust, which would pay tax and administrative creditors first and
then the general unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.134
(4) Jevic’s Chapter 11 case would be dismissed.135

Thus, the settlement was comprised of a structured dismissal, i.e.: “a
disposition that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached
instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante.”136
The major issue of the settlement agreement was that it left out the
Drivers, completely disregarding their uncontested WARN Act claim
against Jevic.137 The Drivers estimated their claim to have been valued at
$12.4 million, “of which $8.3 million was a priority wage claim[.]”138
While it may be true that Jevic was able to quickly structure a settlement
with one fell swoop of the pen, ultimately the settlement skipped an entire
class of creditors, i.e., the Drivers.139 Jevic’s assets were distributed to all
other creditors but the Drivers.140
The Third Circuit ultimately upheld this structured dismissal.141 The
structured dismissal essentially picked whom Jevic was going to pay back
in order for their case to be dismissed with prejudice, while the Drivers’

131

In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177.
Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177 (“There was just one problem with the
settlement: it left out the Drivers, even though they had an uncontested WARN Act claim
against Jevic . . . [and] held claims of higher priority than the tax and trade creditors’
claims.”).
138 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)); see In re Powermate Holding Corp., 394 B.R.
765, 773 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (“Courts have consistently held that WARN Act damages
are within ‘the nature of wages’ for which § 507(a)(4) provides.”).
139 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177.
140 Id. at 185.
141 Id. at 186.
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priority claim became an afterthought.142 The Third Circuit noted that
settlements are favored in bankruptcy (as in other areas of law) and
reasoned that it makes sense that courts would have more flexibility in
evaluating settlements than in confirming plans, given the “dynamic status
of some pre-plan bankruptcy settlements.”143 Although the Third Circuit
took this approach, it cautioned that compliance with the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme would usually dictate whether a settlement
satisfies the fair and equitable standard.144 The court noted that settlement
agreements that skip a dissenting class of creditors in distributing the
estate’s assets raise concerns regarding potential collusion.145
The Third Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had a
sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured dismissal of
Jevic’s bankruptcy case, as it was the “least bad alternative.”146 The court
reasoned that, “there was no prospect of a plan being confirmed” and
conversion to Chapter 7147 would have simply resulted in all of the estate
assets going to the secured creditors.148 The court noted that it was
regrettable that the Drivers were left out of the settlement; and that there
was no support in the record for the proposition that a viable alternative
existed that would have better served the estate and the creditors as a
whole.149 The court recognized that the bankruptcy court, “in Solomonic
fashion, reluctantly approved the only course that resulted in some
payment to creditors other than CIT and Sun.”150
D. Third Circuit Overruled: The Supreme Court Decision of Jevic
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the Drivers’ unpaid priority claim in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding
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See id.
Id. (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium
Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)).
144 Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 455) (“[W]e agree with the
Second Circuit’s statement that compliance with the Code priorities will usually be
dispositive of whether a proposed settlement if fair and equitable.”).
145 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 186 (citing In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478
F.3d at 464) (“Settlements that skip objecting creditors in distributing estate assets raise
justifiable concerns about collusion among debtors, creditors, and their attorneys and other
professionals.”).
146 Id. at 185.
147 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Article, Bankruptcy’s Corporate Tax Loophole, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2273, 2276 (2014) (“For one thing, Chapter 11 allows a debtor’s
incumbent management team to command the liquidation process, whereas Chapter 7
requires management to relinquish control to a trustee.”).
148 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 185 (internal quotations omitted).
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Corp. (Jevic).151 The main question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether a bankruptcy court could approve a structured dismissal that
deviated from priority rules, to which the Court responded with a simple
“no.”152 The Court held that, when creditors object in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding, a structured dismissal attached to a final
distribution must follow priority.153 This decision ultimately overruled the
Third Circuit decision of In re Jevic,154 discussed supra.155
Elaborating on its decision, the Court opined that the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme constituted the basic foundation of bankruptcy
law.156 Observing the importance of priority, the Court reasoned that
Congress would not be silent if they intended a departure from the rules.157
Instead, the Court noted that if Congress intended to make structured
dismissals a backdoor means to violate priority in final distributions,
Congress would have expressly indicated that intent in the Bankruptcy
Code.158 The Court explained that neither the words “structured” nor
“conditions,” nor any other language relating to distributions of estate
value as part of a dismissal were present in any relevant part of the Code.159
Most notably for the purposes of this Comment, the Court noted that
the Third Circuit relied upon Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors (Iridium),160 but distinguished the holding from that
case because Iridium did not address a structured dismissal.161 Rather,
Iridium concerned “an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund
a litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s behalf.”162 The
Court opined that Iridium did not state that the Bankruptcy Code
authorized deviations from priority while there were objecting parties
151

See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017).
Id. at 983.
153 See id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a
Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic
priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final
distribution of estate value in business bankruptcies.”).
154 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that structured dismissals that
deviate from priority rules, may, in rare instances, be upheld).
155 See discussion supra Part II.C.
156 Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
157 See id. at 984.
158 See id. (“We find nothing in the statute that evinces this intent. The Code gives a
bankruptcy court the power to ‘dismiss’ a Chapter 11 case. But the word ‘dismiss’ itself
says nothing about the power to make nonconsensual priority-violating distributions of
estate value.”) (internal citations omitted).
159 See id.
160 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating
LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007).
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within the context of a dismissal, which would be a final distribution.163
The Court ultimately held that the structured dismissal at issue was a final
distribution of estate value where priority must be followed.164
Alternatively, the Court mentioned, in dicta, that the Bankruptcy Code
usually contains justifications for interim distributions that deviate from
priority.165
The Court contrasted the Second Circuit case of Iridium, which
concerned an interim distribution that violated priority, with the Third
Circuit case of In re Jevic, which concerned a structured dismissal that
violated priority but attached to a final disposition.166 The Court noted that
the structured dismissal found in In re Jevic had a resemblance to the
transactions lower courts generally refused to allow for purposes that they
“circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards.”167 Moreover, the Court
stated that the “rare case” limitation of In re Jevic would not save the Third
Circuit’s decision.168 The “rare case” exception, the Court reasoned,
would cause potentially serious consequences of uncertainty and departure
from protections Congress has granted.169
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Leaves Door Open: Future Priority-Deviations
in Interim Settlements
Chapter 11 parties and courts around the country may have difficulty
discerning the Jevic decision.170 While instruments such as structured
dismissals will be barred from priority-deviation if they are of a final
163

See id.
See id.
165 See id. (“We recognize that Iridium is not the only case in which a court has
approved interim distributions that violate ordinary priority rules. But in such instances one
can generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-violating
distributions serve.”).
166 See id. at 985–86 (Noting that the aspect of priority-violation in a final disposition
contains no justification, the Court noted: “By way of contrast, in a structured dismissal
like the one ordered below, the priority-violating distribution is attached to a final
disposition; it does not preserve the debtor as a going concern; it does not make the
disfavored creditors better off; it does not promote the possibility of a confirmable plan; it
does not help to restore the status quo ante; and it does not protect reliance interests. In
short, we cannot find in the violation of ordinary priority rules that occurred here any
significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification.”).
167 Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
168 See id. (“We recognize that the Third Circuit did not approve nonconsensual
priority-violating structured dismissals in general. To the contrary, the court held that they
were permissible in those ‘rare case[s]’ in which courts could find ‘sufficient reasons’ to
disregard priority. Despite the ‘rare case’ limitation, we still cannot agree.”).
169 See id.
170 See Lubben, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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dispositional nature, an interim distribution of assets can deviate from
priority rules.171 The Jevic Court failed to clarify when a distribution of
assets is considered interim.172 Due to this uncertainty, it is foreseeable
that parties in search of options to avoid the absolute priority rule will
choose the settlement context to do so, mainly due to the Supreme Court’s
express approval of Iridium, where a priority-deviating interim-settlement
was approved. Therefore, even though there may be other interim routes
available, the settlement context can soon become the avenue of choice for
Chapter 11 parties seeking priority-deviation.
In 2007, the Second Circuit decided Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors (Iridium).173 The Second Circuit ultimately found
that the absolute priority rule “is not necessarily implicated” when a
settlement is presented for court approval apart from a reorganization
plan.174 The court reviewed the argument from the AWECO Court, which
suggested that the absolute priority rule ought to apply in pre-plan
settlements, but disagreed and, stated that the Fifth Circuit “employ[ed]
too rigid a test.”175 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court specifically
distinguished the case of Iridium as a permissible violation of priority due
to its interim nature.176
The Second Circuit noted that, “whether a particular settlement’s
distribution scheme complies with the Code’s priority scheme must be the
most important factor for the bankruptcy court to consider when
determining whether a settlement is ‘fair and equitable’ . . . .”177 While
this is true, the court noted that a noncompliant settlement could be
approved when the remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of approving
the settlement.178 Specifically, when there are other factors that, viewed
in the aggregate, compose a much more daunting challenge to fairness and
equity, the absolute priority rule may be disregarded.179 The Second
Circuit posited that there are circumstances that are better served by
deviating from the rigidness of the absolute priority rule.180
On April 25, 2017, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division, decided the case of In
171
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re Fryar (Fryar).181 Fryar was the first bankruptcy case to interpret the
Supreme Court decision of Jevic. In Fryar, the debtor filed, inter alia, a
motion for settlement.182 The settlement agreement sought to repay
Pinnacle Bank, who had a lien on the debtor’s property in the form of a
mortgage.183 Three unsecured creditors objected to the settlement
agreement between the debtor and Pinnacle, claiming that Pinnacle was
being preferred and “the priorities set for distribution under the bankruptcy
code [were] being ordered to Pinnacle’s benefit.”184 Thus, the three
unsecured creditors argued the settlement was not fair and equitable.185
The court in Fryer analyzed the settlement under the guidance of the
Supreme Court decision of Jevic.186 First, the court noted that the
settlement did not in fact follow ordinary priority rules.187 Next, in light
of Jevic, the court noted that the settlement might be upheld if all the
creditors consented, but this was not the case.188 Instead, in following the
Supreme Court’s dicta, the court stated that the next step must be to
determine whether there were any significant Code-related justifications
for the deviation at hand.189 The court found that the debtor had failed to
prove that the priority-deviation by virtue of the settlement agreement with
Pinnacle would promote a Code-related objective.190 Ultimately, the court
held that: due to “the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Jevic, parties who
seek approval of settlements that provide for a distribution in a manner
contrary to the Code’s priority scheme should be prepared to prove that
the settlement . . . is justified because it serves a significant Code-related
objective.”191
The cases of Iridium and Fryar are examples of the potential interim
distributions of assets that violate priority through the medium of
settlement agreements. Even though the court in Fryar invalidated the
settlement agreement at issue for lack of Code-related justifications as per
the dicta in Jevic,192 the case itself shows that the settlement context could
see an increase in selection for future Chapter 11 proceedings as a means
of priority-deviation. While there are new safeguards in place to prevent
181
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deviation,193 the Supreme Court decision of Jevic still leaves open the door
for priority-deviations. As subsequent sections of this Comment suggest,
a post hoc justification for priority-deviation does not preserve justice in
bankruptcy law and should not be the standard going forward.194
B. The Dangers of Priority-Deviation
The entire process of Chapter 11 bankruptcy without priority creates
an escape hatch for more junior creditors to satisfy their claims, while
senior claimants are left holding the bag. At this point the question must
be proposed: what is the advantage of being a senior creditor if your
priority position can be lawfully usurped before the case is resolved?
Fairness and equity cannot be found in situations like Iridium, and other
similar cases involving priority deviations through interim means.195 The
fact that courts have only looked to the substance of the settlement
between the debtor and a particular creditor to determine the fairness of
the overall proceeds “contravenes a basic notion of fairness.”196 A plan
that deviates from the absolute priority rule sets a lawless stage of takewhat-you-can-get mentality that destroys the bedrock principles of priority
that bankruptcy law is founded upon.
Through the means of an interim settlement, a debtor can be wholly
depleted of assets before a senior creditor has a chance to be paid back
while the settlement is upheld as fair.197 Without the rigid adherence to
the absolute priority rule, assets may be freely taken in all directions at any
time leading up to a plan being confirmed and create an abundance of
dissatisfied creditors, e.g., the Drivers in the overruled Third Circuit
decision of In re Jevic.198 Although the Supreme Court remedied the
193 See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017) (prohibiting
priority-deviations over creditor objections at the final disposition stage of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding); Fryar, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123 (holding that interim settlements
that deviate from priority must be justified by a significant Bankruptcy Code related
objective).
194 See discussion infra Part III.B.
195 See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (suggesting
that the priority-deviating mechanisms in interim distributions of assets in Chapter 11 cases
are permissible); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (recognizing permitting business
debtors to reorganize and restructure their debts in order to revive the debtors’ businesses
and maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate as purposes of the Code) (internal
quotations omitted); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
justifications for critical-vendor orders); Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding an
interim distribution of assets that deviated from the priority rules of Chapter 11
bankruptcy).
196 In re AWECO Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984).
197 See id.
198 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Drivers’ issue, the Supreme Court still left open the door for future
deviations of priority, which can leave future Chapter 11 parties emptyhanded in a similar fashion to the Drivers.199 This is a slippery slope that
can undermine the entire construct and goals of bankruptcy law. Without
the rule’s protections, a reorganization plan may leave more senior
creditors out of the equation entirely.
Furthermore, it is possible that any reason can be reason enough for
parties to seek deviation from priority rules. For example, in the Third
Circuit case of In re Jevic, Sun was unwilling to pay the Drivers as long
as their WARN Act lawsuit continued due to their interest in the
litigation.200 The Third Circuit noted that Sun, “did not want to fund
litigation against itself.”201 Yet, the structured dismissal was still
approved.202 The case of In re Jevic, while overruled, is still an example
of how reasons such as conflicts of interest can lead to deviation from the
absolute priority rule, thus leaving senior creditors unpaid.203 Conflicts of
interest can still be reason enough to deviate from priority, and in light of
the recent decision of the Supreme Court, interim distributions are an
avenue for deviation to continue.
It is foreseeable that future Chapter 11 settlement negotiations will,
inter alia, involve parties who have direct interests against each other.
With a relaxed interpretation of the absolute priority rule, interested parties
will continue to be able to pick and choose when and how they will get
paid back through interim settlements. Applying the absolute priority rule
at all stages of Chapter 11 proceedings would hedge that process before
litigation ensued. If it is not in the priority order, then there should be no
possibility for unjust distribution of assets, regardless of the interests of
certain creditors. Moreover, applying a strict priority rule could
potentially benefit debtors, as a rigid application of the absolute priority
rule would create a less muddied scheme in which there is a concrete order
for paying back creditors. There would be less confusion and less
animosity between “who” gets “what” priority.
Arguably most important, due to a relaxed priority scheme under the
guise of absolute priority in Chapter 11 proceedings, it is possible that
creditors will expressly contract out of Chapter 11 with debtors for fear of
not being paid back. The mere possibility that a creditor who obtains a
199
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senior claim to the debtor’s assets can be overtaken by a junior creditor
through an interim settlement agreement that complies with any Code
related justification could cause creditors to shy away from Chapter 11
altogether. In order to be better protected, a perturbed creditor cognizant
of the parameters of the lenient priority rule might attempt to preclude the
debtor from choosing Chapter 11 as a reorganizational tool by express
language in a loan agreement. Thus, a relaxed rule of priority in Chapter
11 can lead to a decrease in Chapter 11 filings entirely. Why would courts
be willing to risk so much?
C. Counter-Analysis
Before the Supreme Court decision of Jevic, adhering to the absolute
priority rule in Chapter 11 was far from the norm. A modified and more
lenient standard had taken center stage in lieu of the more rigid rule. The
results were detrimental to priority creditors.204 So what seems to be the
reason for the prior deviations? First, deviation from the absolute priority
rule, especially in settlements, tends to hasten the process. With a strict
following of the rule, valuation fights over the debtor’s assets become
inevitable.205 When parties come to a settlement agreement, courts seldom
wish to intervene and further complicate the process. Courts encourage
settlement in every facet of the law and bankruptcy is no different.206 To
hasten the progression of settlements in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, as seen in
the Second207 and Third208 Circuit decisions, the debtor is allowed some
leeway in distributing its assets and courts will only intervene if there are
not “specific and credible grounds to justify the deviation.”209
An argument against the efficiency of these rulings and the
avoidance of valuation fights is: if parties are already aware of the
implications of a strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule at all
stages of Chapter 11, then the parties will understand what they are going
up against ab initio and plan accordingly. Giving the parties more
information at the onset of the litigation will create more informed parties
when settlement negotiations ultimately arise, which would therefore
decrease the valuation fights at the backend of the settlement and facilitate
204
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Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
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from the rule, so valuation fights were required in every case.”).
206 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 184 (citing Will v. Northwestern Univ.
(In re Nutraquest), 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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205

314

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 13:291

efficiency altogether. A rigid application could cut down negotiation time
because parties to a Chapter 11 case will know where the law stands and
can plan around it. The process would be fair to the senior creditors who
expected their priority position to be respected. There would be
uniformity and reliability in the terms “fair” and “equitable” that could
give Chapter 11 filings a better appeal to creditors who are dealing in this
arena.
Another argument for lenient priority rules stems from the actions
that lead up to the settlement itself, i.e., the debtor’s assets often shift and
reorganize before a plan becomes confirmed. The absolute priority rule is
only implicated at the plan confirmation stage.210 Therefore, by the time
the absolute priority rule is implicated, the debtor’s assets might have
already gone through several substantial deviations from the rule.211 Even
the Supreme Court has acquiesced to pre-plan deviations of priority.212 In
essence, the absolute priority rule can be seen as “rigor for rigor’s sake,”213
an almost useless barrier towards the end of the case because it is not often
followed leading up to the plan confirmation stage to begin with.
Since priority-deviation is lawful leading up to plan confirmation,214
the absolute priority rule can, in essence, seem to be an odd creature of
rigidity that lacks practicality. The prophylactic purpose of the absolute
priority rule can be entirely frustrated through any instrument, as long as
deviation does not occur during the final disposition of a case. But, if
priority becomes truly absolute throughout the entire bankruptcy
proceeding leading up to plan confirmation, then the rule will not be a
useless barrier at the end of a Chapter 11 case. Parties would be barred
from priority-deviation at all stages of a Chapter 11 case, not just at the
plan confirmation phase. Therefore, strict adherence to the absolute
priority rule at all stages of Chapter 11 bankruptcy would ultimately
absolve the argument that the rule is rigor for rigor’s sake, and instead
would become rigor for justice’s sake.
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See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
See Lubben, supra note 205, at 598 (“The debtor-firm’s assets at the end-point of
the case are subject to the [absolute priority] rule, but those assets might have been
significantly reshaped before that point.”).
212 See generally Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (noting that
pre-plan distributions of assets that deviate from priority are usually justified).
213 See Lubben, supra note 205, at 602 (“Strict application at confirmation seems little
more than rigor for rigor’s sake, at a point when the barn door has been open for too long.”).
214 See id. at 601 (citing Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 258, 308 (2012)) (“More generally, as noted earlier, the application of strict absolute
priority rule at the point of plan confirmation seems somewhat odd given the well-known
practices that allow deviations from priority for various practical reasons before
confirmation.”).
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Consequently, even though rigid adherence to the absolute priority
rule through all stages of a Chapter 11 proceeding may, inter alia, add an
element of sharpened due diligence at the onset of the case, it is the best
way to ensure just outcomes for creditors. There will be less power in the
hands of the courts to determine when the rule will actually apply, i.e.,
determining the line between interim and final distributions of assets. It is
inherently unjust and unfair to usurp a senior creditor’s priority by striking
a deal with a junior creditor at any given stage of a bankruptcy proceeding.
It leaves the door open for depletion of the debtor’s assets without a proper
chance for the senior creditor to exact its claims in a timely fashion. Junior
creditors would benefit at the detriment of senior creditors, and as such,
those proceedings are not fair and equitable per se.
D. The Fifth Circuit Standard Should Apply
The Fifth Circuit’s fair and equitable standard215 should be applied
to all aspects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, thereby hedging the
potential increase of priority-deviating settlements and precluding any
other interim mechanism that seeks deviation. The Fifth Circuit noted that,
“[a]s soon as a debtor filed a petition for relief, fair and equitable
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”216 This
goal does not just suddenly surface during the approval process of
Without the absolute priority rule before plan
compromise.217
confirmation, bankruptcy courts would be able to “favor junior classes of
creditors so long as the approval of the settlement came before the plan.”218
A lack of priority at any stage of a bankruptcy case is at odds with
principles of fairness.219
By applying the Fifth Circuit’s standard of the terms fair and
equitable to all facets of a Chapter 11 proceeding, the line drawn by the
Supreme Court would vanish.220 There would not only be a rigid
215 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v.
American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965)) (“The words ‘fair and equitable’
are terms of art – they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior
ones.’”).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See id. (“Regardless of when the compromise is approved, looking only to the
fairness of the settlement as between the debtor and the settling claimant contravenes a
basic notion of fairness.”).
220 The line drawn by the Supreme Court refers to the Court’s approval of prioritydeviation in interim asset distributions as opposed to disapproval of instruments in Chapter
11 bankruptcy that are attached to a final disposition, e.g., structured dismissals. Hence,
following priority at all stages of a Chapter 11 case would absolve that line and the
ambiguity attached to it.
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adherence to the priority rules at the final resolution of a case but during
all interim stages as well. All facets of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding should be exact and create a reliable precedent for future
creditors to interpret. A lenient approach to the absolute priority rule in
recent case law is diluting the priority scheme of Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in its entirety.221 The interest of creditors is not considered when more
junior interest usurps a senior creditor through interim instruments such as
settlement agreements.
There is a difference between the inherent moral notions of what
constitutes fair and equitable and the “fair and equitable” standard in
bankruptcy law. The “fair and equitable” standard does not apply to
interim settlements in Chapter 11, but fairness and equity are to be
considered in every aspect of law. In AWECO, the court rightfully served
fairness and equity for the senior claimant. The court noted that, even
though the junior creditor reached a “fair and equitable” settlement in
terms of bankruptcy law,222 it was inherently unfair because it would have
skipped over the more senior creditor.223 In order to be truly fair and
equitable, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning must be the standard at all stages
of Chapter 11 proceedings going forward.
The Fifth Circuit argued that if the “fair and equitable” standard had
no application before the plan confirmation, then bankruptcy courts would
have the discretion to favor junior creditor interests so long as the approval
of the settlement came before the plan.224 That would be neither fair nor
equitable to the skipped senior creditor. The words “equity” and
“fairness” are not just terms of art in bankruptcy—they are catch phrases
of bankruptcy law in general.225 Allowing bankruptcy courts the power to
uphold interim distributions of assets that deviate from priority is
inapposite with the goals of bankruptcy law.
The most effective way to change the trends in this area of
bankruptcy law is to amend the statutory language of the Code to apply
the absolute priority rule into all areas of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, instead
of just confirmed plans of reorganization. Alternatively, a Supreme Court
ruling that commands adherence to the absolute priority rule in all aspects
of a Chapter 11 proceeding would also suffice. If parties wish to waive
221

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (“An estate might be wholly depleted in
settlement of junior claims – depriving senior creditors of full payment – and still be fair
as between the debtor and the settling creditor.”).
223 See id. (“Regardless of when the compromise is approved, looking only to the
fairness of the settlement as between the debtor and the settling claimant contravenes a
basic notion of fairness.”).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 300.
222
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their procedural protections then by all means they should be able to do
so, but when a reorganization plan surfaces—the more senior creditors
need to have a reliable pillar of stability at the forefront. That pillar was—
and still needs to be—the absolute priority rule.
Amending the statutory construction of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) to encompass the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning would truly
create fair and equitable results. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides that a bankruptcy court may not override explicit mandates of
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.226 Further, the Supreme Court
noted that a bankruptcy court may not infringe upon specific statutory
requirements.227 Therefore, an amended Code equipped with the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning—that the absolute priority rule must apply at all stages
of a bankruptcy—would truly insulate the rule from deviation through
express statutory language and added support from the Supreme Court.
Bankruptcy courts should not be able to approve interim distributions
of assets that deviate from priority, regardless of any justifications. In
approving settlements, a court must act “for the benefit of all creditors,”228
not to facilitate quicker negotiations to the detriment of senior creditors
who do not object in time.229 In an analogous situation to AWECO, the
Supreme Court in Protective Committee v. Anderson,230 noted its
sympathy for the desire of a court to terminate drawn-out bankruptcy
proceedings.231 Nonetheless, the Court noted, “[t]he need for expedition
is not a justification for abandoning proper standards.”232 Ultimately,
upholding proper standards is what gives the law its power.
If there are justified situations where creditors must be paid back
outside of priority, e.g., the Code-related justifications the Supreme Court
noted in Jevic, then those justifications should be given express priority in
the Code. This way, those Code-related justifications will remain an
option due to the Code’s express accounting of those justifications in
priority rules. The Code itself would allocate a guaranteed priority
position for those justifiable circumstances. Therefore, the rule will still
retain its true absolute form and account for circumstances where creditors
are better served with quicker access to assets.
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11 U.S.C.S. § 105(a) (1979).
Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014).
228 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 299 (quoting Matter of Boston & Providence R.
Corp., 673 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982)).
229 See id. (internal quotations omitted) (“This obligation prevails even where the
creditors are silent.”).
230 See Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968).
231 See id. at 450.
232 Id.
227

318

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 13:291

Ultimately, having a strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule
will act as a firm backbone to settlement conversations and thus facilitate
a process more apt to fairness from the onset of any possible litigation.
Applying the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the absolute priority rule will
ultimately change the structure of negotiations. If the parties agree to
waive the rule, then that is their decision—but going into a Chapter 11
case without the assurances of a rigid absolute priority rule leaves the more
senior creditors in a vulnerable position. A well-settled law encompassing
absolute priority will finally put to rest the injustice of usurped creditors
and the ambiguity of when the rule is to be applied.
IV. CONCLUSION
A creditor expects to count on a priority system in Chapter 11
bankruptcy the way the human body depends on the spine for support.
Priority ought to be the backbone for all settlement negotiations in Chapter
11 bankruptcy, not just during final dispositions of the case. There must
be a reliable system that does not reward a junior creditor with the priority
right of a senior creditor simply due to time constraints,233 which was noted
in the Fifth Circuit’s decision of In re AWECO, Inc. as a major reason the
bankruptcy court upheld the initial settlement agreement.234 A strict
enforcement of the absolute priority rule at all stages of a bankruptcy case
will put parties on notice at the forefront of litigation. Due to the upfront
knowledge of how priority will be respected, parties will be able to bargain
with more efficiency and certainty.
Admittedly, it is a worthy goal for debtors to make a deal that benefits
them at an opportune time,235 but consider the consequences when a
creditor—who not only expects, but deserves to be in that priority
position—is overtaken by a more junior creditor and left with nothing.
Unreliability of this sort in Chapter 11 proceedings could ultimately deter
Chapter 11 filings through express language in loan agreements between
creditors and debtors. Potential creditors may be less likely to lend to a
debtor knowing priority is not guaranteed, despite efforts to obtain

233 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298 (“Time pressure apparently influenced the
bankruptcy judge to deny the government’s request for a continuance to develop evidence
on the refinery’s worth and to deny the government leave to submit its own appraisal of
the refinery.”).
234 Id. at 300 (“In this case time pressure functioned as a shotgun. The bankruptcy court
blessed the settlement without sufficient factual information to determine if the settlement
was fair and equitable to the government.”).
235 Id. at 299 (“Moreover, preserving a settlement potentially advantageous to the
debtor and its creditors is a worthy goal.”).
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priority. Bankruptcy proceedings should not be risking so much in order
to encourage the mere possibility of swift settlements.236
Furthermore, deviation from the rule up until plan confirmation
undermines the major equitable principles of bankruptcy law. Whereas
some settlements that deviate from the absolute priority rule can be fair
and equitable as a term of art in bankruptcy law,237 when senior creditors
are skipped over in favor of more junior creditors, the settlement becomes
inherently unjust238 and should not be approved. Any scenario where
junior claimants supersede senior creditors creates an unjust environment.
Priority-deviation may be a positive outcome for some parties in their
individual settlements, but siphoning assets is a zero-sum game. Junior
interests will continue to benefit from the non-application of the absolute
priority rule at the expense of senior creditors.239 A rule that masquerades
itself as absolute, when it in fact and practice has become lenient, only
undermines the basic priority constructs of bankruptcy law.
Assuming, arguendo, that a relaxed interpretation of the absolute
priority rule in the settlement context creates a more succinct outcome
blatantly ignores the possibility of efficiency through rigid application of
the rule.240 The shift to rigidity in Chapter 11 priority will lead to more
informed parties and will lead to efficient negotiations. The parties to a
Chapter 11 case will be more informed because the absolute priority rule
will follow its explicit meaning, and not what a court interprets it to be. A
rigid application of the absolute priority rule will foster a process that leads
to less confusion about what the law means from the onset of litigation and
will provide a firm foundation for settlement negotiations. A longer
process may possibly result,241 but that is a small price to pay for
dissolving the ambiguity that has recently been enveloping Chapter 11.
A strict adherence to the absolute priority rule at all stages of a
Chapter 11 case will allow parties to consider the pros and cons of
litigation and use that information as a bargaining tool. Applying the Fifth
Circuit’s strict interpretation of the absolute priority rule will prevent the
use of interim mechanisms as an escape hatch for deviation. Any
justifiable scenario for priority-deviation should be given express priority
in the Bankruptcy Code. Used properly, the absolute priority rule is a
236

See id. at 300.
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
239 See generally Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding an interim distribution
of assets that deviated from the priority rules of Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
240 See discussion supra Part III.C.
241 See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Lubben, supra note 205 and accompanying
text.
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device that can lessen the amount of future contested plans and facilitate
quicker and more efficient negotiations; which is the precise reasoning
many courts employ today for deviating from the absolute priority rule in
the first place.242 Ensuring that parties are aware of rigid application of
the absolute priority rule at the onset of a Chapter 11 proceeding will
ultimately lead to truly fair and equitable results for creditors and debtors
alike.

242

See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.

